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Abstract 
A bank failure can have various adverse consequences for the clients.  The adverse impacts 
might, however, differ depending on who takes over the operation of the failed banks.  In this 
paper, we show that how to manage the new banks is important in mitigating the short-run and 
long-run consequences of bank failures.  In the analysis, we focus on clients of three large 
failed Japanese banks - Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan 
(LTCB), and the Nippon Credit Bank.  We examine when the number of bankruptcies 
increased and how the market valuation changed for the client firms after the banks’ operations 
were taken over by new banks.  As for the clients of LTCB, there were dramatic increases of 
bankruptcies in the short-run but the surviving clients showed significant recovery of their stock 
prices.  In contrast, as for the clients of the other two banks, there was neither dramatic 
increase of bankruptcies nor significant recovery of their stock prices.  The result implies that 
“shock therapy” or “soft budget constraints” had dramatically different consequences in solving 
bad loan problems in Japan. 
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Japanese economy experienced a prolonged slump after the collapse of the asset price 
bubble of the late 1980s.  There are a large number of studies that have investigated why the 
slump had been so prolonged.    Although their conclusions vary, it is widely recognized that the 
problem of “bad loans” was one of the major sources for “the lost-decade” in Japan.    Figure 1 
and Figure 2 respectively depict the amounts of bad loans (risk management loans) and total 
losses on disposal of non-performing loans of all banks and major banks from FY1992 to 
FY2003.    They show that bad loans started to increase after the crash of the bubble in the early 
1990s and kept accumulating until 2001, causing a large amount of losses on disposal of 
non-performing loans.  This implies that policy prescriptions for bad loan problems in the 
banking sector were far from satisfactory in solving the prolonged recession in the 1990s. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a case study that explores what consequences “soft 
budget constraints” and “shock therapy” had in solving the bad loan problems in Japan.    In the 
analysis, we focus on the market valuation of the clients of three large failed Japanese banks - 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (HTB), the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB), and the 
Nippon Credit Bank (NCB), and examine when the number of their bankruptcies had increased 
and how their stock prices had changed after the banks’ operations were taken over by new 
banks.  In the presence of asymmetric information and incomplete contract, banking 
relationships enhance the value of client firms.  A bank failure can therefore have various 
adverse consequences for the clients, even when observable characteristics relating to borrower 
risk are controlled for.  The adverse impacts might, however, differ depending on who took 
over the operations of the failed banks. 
In the case of the clients of LTCB, the impacts appeared as a “shock therapy” where there 
were dramatic increases of bankruptcies after the new bank started its operation.    The negative 
impacts were, however, temporary and the surviving clients started to show significant recovery 
of their stock prices.  In contrast, in the cases of the other two banks’ clients, we see no 
dramatic increase of bankruptcies.  Their stock prices, however, did not show any significant 
recovery under “soft budget constraints” where the bank accepts the request for debt forgiveness 
and keeps pouring loans into insolvent client
 firms.
1  The result implies that the choice of the 
“shock therapy” or the “soft budget constraints” by the new banks had dramatically different 
impacts on the clients’ market valuation.  One may argue that the “shock therapy” by the new 
LTCB is partly attributable to the “cancellation right” (warranty of loan related assets), that 
allowed the new LTCB to return the assets to the government for liquidation if their value fell 
                                                  
1 The terminology of “soft budget constraints” follows that in previous studies such as Dewatripon 
and Maskin (1995) and Berglöf and Roland (1995). 
 2sufficiently.
2    It is, however, worthwhile to note that the government agreed the same rules for 
the sale contract with both the new LTCB and the new NCB.  The different consequences 
between LTCB’s and NCB’s clients are thus largely attributable to different management 
strategies taken by the new banks rather than the form of sale contract such as the “cancellation 
right”. 
In previous literature, a number of papers provide empirical evidence on adverse 
consequences for the clients of the failed banks.
3    In particular, Yamori and Murakami (1999), 
focusing on HTB, and Brewer, Genay, Hunter, and Kaufman (2003a), focusing on HTB, LTCB, 
and NCB, examine the effects of the bank failures on their customers in Japan.
4    They find that 
the stock returns of customers of the bank unexpectedly declined at the time of failure 
announcement.
5  Our results are in marked contrast with these studies in showing that who 
took over the operations is important in mitigating short-run and long-run consequences of the 
bank failures.  If banks had accumulated huge amounts of bad loans, their failures would be 
inevitable.    It is thus important to see how to mitigate the adverse impacts of the bank failures.   
Our results imply that the “shock therapy” would exacerbate short-run bankruptcies but that the 
“soft budget” would be accompanied by more costly long-run adverse impacts. 
A defining characteristic of Japanese bank failures in the late 1990s was that the failed 
banks had concealed the true extent of their problems in order to reduce the reported amount of 
nonperforming loans on their book or to inflate their reported capital.    In particular, when bank 
failed, it turned out that the magnitude of bad loans and valuation losses previously disclosed 
had been significantly understated.
6    The market participants thus revised their estimates of the 
size of bad loans upward and became suspicious against the valuation of the surviving clients of 
the failed bank.  If a new bank still follows traditional management techniques with “soft 
                                                  
2 Spiegel (2002) pointed out that such assurances had been used in the United States in the savings 
and loan (S&L) crisis in the late 1980s and early 1900s.    He reviewed the circumstances 
surrounding the sale of LTCB and NCB as well as the U.S. experience in the S&L crisis. 
3 Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993) studied the effects of the de facto failure of Continental 
Illinois Bank and its subsequent rescue by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) during 
1984 on the share prices of the bank’s loan customers.    They showed that the impending failure led 
to negative excess returns for firms with a lending relationship with Continental, while the rescue led 
to positive excess returns for those firms. 
4 Using Japanese data, Gibson (1995) found that firm investment is sensitive to the financial health 
of the firm’s main bank, holding Tobin’s Q and cash flow constant.    Kang and Stulz (2000) showed 
that firms that were more dependent on bank finance suffered significantly larger wealth losses 
during the first 3 years of the 1990s when the Japanese stock market fell dramatically. 
5 Hori and Takahashi (2003), in contrast, find that the customers’ profits showed no significant 
decline after the HTB’s failure.    Miyajima and Yafeh (2003) explored abnormal returns of 
non-financial companies around various significant dates in history of the banking crisis, including 
failures of the three banks. 
6 For example, the bad loans at HTB were actually three times the amount stated in its last financial 
statement. 
 3budget constraints”, the market valuation of the clients would remain low even after the new 
bank started their operation.  In particular, if the bank allows insolvent firms to continue to 
operate, the problems could result in fewer profitable investments by firms that are highly 
dependent on bank financing.    In contrast, if a new bank changes its management technique to 
the “shock therapy”, the stock market might react favorably for the surviving customers because 
most of insolvent clients were cleared up.    The “shock therapy” has a short-run adverse impact 
because of temporary increases in bankruptcies.    However, the “shock therapy” might increase 
profitable investments by solvent firms and have a desirable consequence for economic 
efficiency in the long-run. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  After outlining the three bank failures in section 2, we 
explore their impacts on the number of bankruptcies in section 3.  Section 4 proposes the 
positive revaluation hypothesis and section 5 explains our methodology and data to test the 
hypothesis.  Section 6 presents our basic empirical results.  Section 7 summarizes our main 
results and refers to their implications. 
 
 
2. Three Large Bank Failures 
In the following analysis, we explore various impacts of three failed Japanese banks - 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (HTB) on November 17, 1997, the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan 
(LTCB) on October 23, 1998, and the Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) on December 13, 1998.  
HTB was the first large bank so resolved in the post-war Japan, and LTCB and NCB were 
among the largest and most visible Japanese banks.  Table 1 reports the amounts of loans 
outstanding of these three banks as well as those of other major banks in March 1997 and in 
March 1998.  The amounts of loans of the three banks were not as big as those of top six city 
banks.    However, the amount of LTCB’s loans outstanding was the 10
th largest.    Even in HTB 
that was the smallest among the three, the loans outstanding amounted to 6 trillion yen. 
The resolution of these banks was a turning point of the government policy because it 
revealed that Japanese regulators would no longer use “too-big-to-fail” policy.  The 
government reactions to the three bank failures had several common features.    The government 
announced that it would guarantee all of their obligations; the bank’s bad loans were sold to the 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC); and the Bank of Japan extended emergency loans to the 
banks during the transition period to provide liquidity to meet deposit outflows.  The failed 
banks, however, had several different features on who took over their operations.     
The operation of HTB was taken over by other private banks.  Unlike the traditional 
convoy system, where the entire troubled institutions would merge with a stronger institution, 
the assets of HTB was sold piecemeal or liquidated.  In principle, its operations in the 
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region to Chuo Trust and Banking Co.  Only good assets of the bank were, however, 
transferred, and its bad loans were sold to DIC.    Focusing on the firms listed on the Tokyo and 
Sapporo stock exchanges, Table 2 reports how many clients of HTB were transferred to these 
two banks.  In calculating the figures, we first defined the clients of HTB when HTB was 
either one of the top five in its loan share or its loan share exceeded 5% in March 1998.  We 
then explored which banks increased their loans when HTB disappeared in the bank list in 
March 1999.    All of the data were take from 2000 issue of Kigyo Keiretsu Soran (published by 
Toyo Keizai).  The table shows that 82% of the HTB’s clients (41 out of 50 clients) were 
transferred either to the North Pacific Bank or to Chuo Trust and Banking Co.  Six  clients  were, 
however, transferred to the other banks, and three clients were transferred to nobody. 
LTCB and NCB were, on the other hand, nationalized first.  Their good assets were then 
sold to a consortium of private investors.  In both cases, the Financial Reconstruction 
Commission (FRC) invited bidders for these banks under the condition that sale was to take 
place quickly.  LTCB was sold to a group of American investors, who tried to introduce 
American management techniques as a bold new experiment in financial reform.  The new 
LTCB started its operation on March 1, 2000 and changed its name to “Shinsei Bank” on June 5, 
2000.  Almost since its inception, Shinsei Bank has been controversial figure in Japanese 
financial markets.  NCB was, in contrast, sold to a group of domestic investors, who tried to 
follow traditional corporate ways in Japan.    The new NCB started its operation on September 1, 
2000 and changed its name to “Aozora Bank” on January 2001. 
When the government sold the nationalized LTCB and NCB to the private investors, the 
government promised the “cancellation right” (warranty of loan related assets) to each of the 
new banks.    The “cancellation right”, or Kashi-tampo in Japanese, was bastardized version of a 
loss-sharing scheme, albeit potentially far more costly for the government.
7  Unlike standard 
loss-sharing arrangements that split any future losses between the government and the private 
investors, the government promised to provide a moderate level of reserves against loss on bad 
loans, using public funds.  It also guaranteed that during the first three years the purchaser 
could “return” any loan if they lost more than 20 percent of their value, provided that they also 
returned the relevant reserves.  If these reserves did not compensate the loss on the loan, the 
bank would then be compensated as well.  This was akin to a “put” option, or the right to sell 
the purchased loan at a future date in certain conditions, “putting” the loan back to the 
government if its value falls sufficiently low.  Under this scheme, the government would need 
                                                  
7 In legal term, this was an odd proposal.    The concept of Kashi-tampo had first appeared in the 
nineteenth century, when the government created a law to cover street makers and other forms of 
trading.    In theory, nobody had ever thought of extending this concept to banking. 
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government.  The government therefore had a risk that the cost of the scheme could go up 
dramatically at a later date. 
 
 
3. The Impacts on the Number of Bankruptcies 
A bank failure can have various adverse consequences for the clients.  In particular, if the 
adverse impacts are large enough, it might lead the client firms to go bankrupt.    In this section, 
we investigate the impacts of the three large bank failures on bankruptcy probabilities of their 
borrowers.  Specifically, we explore how the number of bankruptcies had changed for the 
client firms before and after the new banks took over the operations. 
 
(a) The Number of Bankruptcies of Listed Companies 
We first analyze the number of bankruptcies of the clients that were listed on the stock 
exchanges or on over the counter markets.
8  In the analysis, we focused on the clients for 
which one of the three failed banks was one of the top five in the loan shares.
9  We define 
"bankruptcy" when a company is recognized as corresponding to any of the following 7 cases.  
(1) Drawing unpaid notes two times and business is suspended.  (2) Dissolution of the 
company (when the representative admits being bankrupt).  (3) Applying for Corporate 
Rehabilitation Law to the court.  (4) Applying for dissolution arrangement under Commercial 
Code to the court.  (5) Applying for Civil Rehabilitation Law to the court.  (6) Applying for 
bankruptcy to the court.    (7) Applying for commencement of special liquidation proceedings to 
the court.  The above can be classified broadly into "voluntary liquidation" consisting of (1) 
and (2), and "legal liquidation" consisting of (3) and (4).    It is also divided into the "bankruptcy 
for liquidation purposes" aimed at company liquidation (extinction) and the "bankruptcy for 
reconstruction purposes" whereby the company pays off its debts while remaining in business. 
Table 3 summarizes the number of bankrupt firms for each failed bank for each sub-period.   
From December 1997 to September 2003, 92 listed companies went bankrupt in total in Japan.  
Among them, 22 were the clients of LTCB, 10 were the clients of NCB, and 5 were the clients 
of HTB.  Allowing their loan outstanding, the number of bankruptcies of the three banks’ 
clients is larger than that of other major banks.  In particular, the number is larger for the 
                                                  
8 Japan had eight stock exchanges in 1997: Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto (merged into Osaka 
March 2001), Hiroshima (merged into Tokyo March 2000), Fukuoka, Niigata (merged into Tokyo 
March 2000), and Sapporo.    Over the counter markets are JASDAQ, Mothers in Tokyo, NASDAQ 
JAPAN in Osaka (Hercules in Osaka after December 2002), Centrex in Nagoya, Ambitious in 
Sapporo, and Q-BOARD in Fukuoka.   
9 We identify the clients of HTB by using the bank lists in March 1998 and those of LTCB and NCB 
by using the lists in March 1999. 
 6clients of LTCB than for those of the other two failed banks.  However, loans outstanding of 
LTCB were twice as much as those of NCB and nearly three times as much as those of HTB.  
The number thus does not necessarily imply that the clients of LTCB had much larger 
bankruptcy probabilities than those of the other two failed banks throughout the whole period. 
The clients of LTCB, however, had a remarkable feature in that most of the bankruptcies 
had occurred in two years after the new bank, “Shinsei Bank”, took over the LTCB’ operation.  
In particular, from April 2000 to September 2000, Japan experienced eight bankruptcies of listed 
companies, five of which were the clients of LTCB.  This implies that dramatic increases of 
bankruptcies occurred for the clients of LTCB in six months after the new bank started its 
operation.  In contrast, we see no significant increase of bankruptcies for the clients of the 
other two banks even after the new banks started their operations.    The result implies that only 
the clients of LTCB faced the “shock therapy” when the new LTCB introduced American 
management strategies as a bold new experiment in financial reform. 
 
(b) The Number of Bankruptcies of All Clients 
The different management strategies taken by the new banks are still observed even if we 
extend our samples to unlisted companies.    Table 4 summarizes the number of bankrupt clients 
of LTCB and NCB and their total liabilities for each semi-year.  A noteworthy feature in the 
table is that it includes not only bankruptcies of listed companies but also those of unlisted 
companies.    The data was taken from each bank’s report on “Business Revitalization Plan” that 
was submitted to the Financial Service Agency (the “FSA”) each year.
10   
In the table, we can see remarkable surges of bankruptcies for the LTCB’s clients around the 
first half of 2000.  This implies that not only listed but also unlisted clients of LTCB 
experienced dramatic increases of bankruptcies in six months after the new bank started its 
operation.  The surges of bankruptcies, however, did not persist and almost disappeared in 
2002.  In contrast, we see no significant increase of bankruptcies for the clients of NCB in 
2000 when the new bank started its operation.  Instead, the clients of NCB had faced almost 
constant probabilities of bankruptcies throughout the whole period.    The result implies that the 
clients of NCB could avoid bankruptcy in the short-run but kept suffering from a high 
bankruptcy risk even in the long-run. 
 
(c) Implementation of the “Cancellation Right” 
When the new banks took over the nationalized LTCB and NCB, the government agreed the 
                                                  
10 In Japan, all private banks that had public capital injection are required to report the number of 
bankruptcies of their clients in “Business Revitalization Plan” as disclosure categories under the 
Financial Reconstruction Law. 
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related assets) to both of the banks.  The right influenced the banks’ management of the 
existing loans and made the banks reluctant to rollover the loans if there were reasonable 
expectations of losses.  In particular, the compensation from the government motivated the 
banks not to grant major concessions to avoid liquidation of bad loans.     
Shinsei Bank (the new LTCB) was, however, more aggressive than Aozora Bank (the new 
NCB) in implementing the cancellation right.  In particular, Shinsei Bank was aggressive in 
demanding restructuring plans from problem debtors and hardly shied away from collateral 
seizure in the events of default.  Based on reports by the Financial Service Agency (FSA), 
Table 5 summarizes the number of clients, the book value of the loans, and the amount of 
payments for which each new bank implemented the cancellation right from March 2001 to 
September 2003.    The table suggests that even allowing the size difference between two banks, 
Shinsei Bank was more aggressive than Aozora Bank in its relative unwillingness to roll over 
loans of problem debtors.    In particular, Shinsei Bank tended to implement the right before the 
clients declared "legal bankruptcy".  Based on unpublished reports by the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (DIC), Table 6 summarizes reasons why each new bank implemented the 
cancellation right until September 2002.  It indicates that more than half of the clients which 
Shinsei Bank implemented the right before the clients declared "legal bankruptcy" eventually 
went bankrupt until September 2002. 
In establishing the rules of the sale contract, the government promised to buy back the loans 
if they lost more than 20 percent of their value.    Therefore, when the clients went bankrupt, the 
banks could implement the right automatically.    However, when the clients were still alive, the 
banks need to verify that the purchased loan had depreciated more than 20 percent of their value.   
The table suggests that Shinsei Bank was more aggressive in the verification, which led to more 
frequent bankruptcies of its clients.  In particular, when we focus on the companies that 
declared "legal bankruptcy" before January 2003, Shinsei Bank implemented the right for 49 
clients, while Aozora did only for 9 clients.   
One of the well know clients Shinsei Bank implemented the right was Sogo for which 
LTCB had been a quasi main bank along with Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ).  Sogo had been 
one of the most prestigious retailers in Japan.  But after the crash of the 1980s bubble, 
Japanese bankers came to recognize that Sogo was effectively bankrupt.  Meanwhile, IBJ and 
LTCB dispatched their own officials to help run Sogo and continued to pour loans into the Sogo 
group.  The forbearance under the “soft budget constraints” had continued even after LTCB 
was nationalized.    When Shinsei Bank took over the operation of LTCB, Sogo asked Shinsei to 
cancel 97 billion yen (925 million USD) in loans, or about half of the total loan outstanding 
with the company.  The request for debt forgiveness was part of a larger IBJ-orchestrated 
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create losses at the other lenders.  In the traditional Japanese banking world, to refuse was 
therefore unusual.  But the rules of the sale contract stipulated that Shinsei could no longer 
implement the cancellation right for the extended loans if it had given debt forgiveness.  
Shinsei therefore decided not to accept the IBJ request to avoid losses from the remaining Sogo 
loans.  On June 28, Shinsei informed the government that it would refuse to extend debt 
forgiveness to Sogo.  Shinsei then exercised the cancellation right for the first time, returning 
the 200 billion yen Sogo loans to the government, together with the 100 billion yen in reserves.   
Eventually, on July 12, Sogo’s board declared that it would apply for Civil Rehabilitation Law 
to the court and went bankrupt.     
 
 
4.  The Hypothesis 
If the bank keeps practicing “soft budget constraints”, it would accept the request for debt 
forgiveness and keep pouring loans into insolvent client
 firms.  To the extent that the market 
recognizes the “soft budget constraints”, the stock prices of the surviving clients would remain 
low.    However, if dramatic increases of bankruptcies clear up most of insolvent clients, default 
risk of surviving clients would decline and the market valuation of the surviving clients may go 
up.  In this case, investors perceive the “shock therapy” of the new bank as positive news, 
generating a positive impact on stock prices of the surviving clients.    In the following sections, 
we call the positive impact of a shock therapy the positive revaluation hypothesis.  We will 
then test the hypothesis by investigating how stock prices of the surviving client firms 
responded to subsequent events on the failed banks.     
A key feature of the positive revaluation hypothesis can be modeled as follows.  Consider 
a continuum of the bank’s client firms that are listed on the stock exchange.    For simplicity, we 
assume that there are only two types of firms: good and bad.  The value of a good firm is G 
and that of a bad firm is zero.    Let x be the fraction of bad firms (so is 1- x the fraction of good 
firms).  Both the bank and the market investors know this distribution.  However, the 
investors cannot distinguish between good and bad firms.  The expected value of a 
representative client firm for the investors is thus (1- x)G, which can be interpreted as the stock 
price of a client firm.     
Because of its information advantage over the investors, the bank can identify some of its 
bad client firms.    However, we assume that the old bank practices “soft budget constraints” and 
kills none of the identified bad clients.    Assuming that the investors know the bank’s behavior, 
the stock prices of the surviving clients thus remain low before the bank is replaced by a new 
one.  Now, suppose that a new bank succeeds the operation and introduces a “shock therapy”.  
 9It kills fraction of y of the client firms, leaving fraction of 1-y listed on the stock exchange.  
The new bank does not have information advantage over the old bank.  Thus, if the old bank 
had already cleaned up the identified bad clients, the “shock therapy” would have been a costly 
policy that kills many good clients.  However, to the extent that the old bank practiced “soft 
budget constraints”, most of the identified bad client firms are still alive before a new bank 
starts its operation.    We therefore assume that the “shock therapy” kills only the identified bad 
client firms.     
The investors, who know that the old bank practiced “soft budget constraints” but that the 
new bank does not, observe the fraction y and update their subjective distribution of a 
representative client firm.  Since the investors recognize that y fraction of bad firms has been 
eliminated by the “shock therapy”, (1-x)/(1-y) becomes updated fraction of good firms among 
the surviving firms.    The expected value of a representative client firm for the investors is thus 
[(1-x)/(1-y)]G, which can be interpreted as the stock price of a client firm after the bank is 
replaced by a new one.    It is easy to see that the expected value [(1-x)/(1-y)]G is increasing in y.   
This implies that the more the “shock therapy” kills the client firms, the more the stock prices of 
the surviving client firms go up.  A key assumption behind this result is that the “shock 
therapy” kills bad client firms.  The assumption would be supported if the old bank practiced 
“soft budget constraints” which leave most of the identified bad client firms alive.    The test of 
the positive revaluation hypothesis will therefore provide an indirect test to examine whether the 
old bank practiced “soft budget constraints” and the new bank does not.     
However, in testing our hypothesis, it is restrictive to assume that investors never 
distinguish the types of firms.  We therefore allow the case where investors identify some of 
insolvent client firms.  For the apparently insolvent clients, the stock prices drop down after 
the “shock therapy” starts because the investors expect that the identified insolvent client firm 
will go bankrupt soon.  In the following empirical studies, we will distinguish the impacts for 
apparently insolvent firms from those for other client firms.   
 
 
5.  The Impacts on the Stock Prices 
(a) Methodology 
In the following sections, we will test the positive revaluation hypothesis through exploring 
how abnormal returns of the surviving client firms responded to subsequent events on the failed 
banks.  The abnormal return is the actual ex post return of the security over the event window 
minus the normal return of the firm over the event window.  For modeling the normal return, 
we choose the market model which assumes a stable linear relation between the market return 
and the security return; Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εit where Rit and Rmt are the period-t stock returns of 
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each event window, we estimate parameters αi and βi for the estimation window that 
corresponds to 60 months prior to the event time. 
The monthly (cumulative) abnormal returns of surviving clients are examined to identify 
any abnormal performance over each event window.  Our methodology is similar to the event 
study methodology used in previous studies in examining abnormal returns over the event 
window (see, for example, MacKinlay [1997] and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay [1997, ch.4] 
for general discussions).  It is likely that the failed bank’s clients had poorer stock market 
performance than their competitors if their financial conditions were worse than those of the 
competitors.  However, if the reported financial conditions of the surviving clients were 
noticeably worse, it is more likely that the poor performance had been reflected in the stock 
prices before the event was announced.  The abnormal returns would therefore reflect the 
market responses to news on the bank failure or to news on the new bank’s operation.     
The basic equation is as follows: 
 
(1) ARi = constant + γ1 D i1 + γ2 D i2 + γ3 D i3 + ΣI δ I D iI + ei, 
 
where ARi is the (cumulative) abnormal returns of firm i over the event window.  When the 
event widow is over two months, we use the cumulative abnormal returns for ARi.  
Explanatory variables D i1, D i2, and D i3 are dummy variables each of which equals to 1 when 
the firm i is a client of HTB, LTCB, and NCB respectively and zero otherwise.  D iI’s are 
industry dummies and ei is a random error.  Each industry dummy D iI takes one when firm i 
belongs to the industry I and zero otherwise.     
In equation (1), we relate the abnormal returns to constant term and clients’ dummies of the 
three failed banks.  The constant term is included to measure how abnormal returns of the 
other banks’ clients responded to various news after the banks failures.  Three dummy 
variables are, in contrast, included to measure how different responses the clients of the three 
failed banks showed.  The coefficients of three dummy variables become significant if and 
only if abnormal returns of the three banks’ clients are significantly different from those of the 
other banks’ clients.  We estimate equation (1) with industry dummies.  The industry 
dummies are dummies for 11 industries using manufacturing industry as a benchmark.  The 
industry dummies are included to account for unobserved industry “fixed effects”.     
 
(b) Data 
For constructing the abnormal return of each firm, we use the monthly rate of stock returns 
for 1276 Japanese non-financial firms listed on the first and second sections of the Tokyo Stock 
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and those in gas & electric power industry.  We also excluded the firms that had no external 
borrowings because our main interest is the impact of bank failures.  The monthly rate of 
returns for the market portfolio is the monthly change of value-weighted-average stock price of 
all firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  All of the data on the 
monthly rate of individual stock returns are provided by the Japan Securities Research Institute 
database 2002, where the rate of stock returns is adjusted so as to include dividend payments 
and allotment of new share to shareholders.    In the analysis, we use data of monthly abnormal 
returns rather than daily abnormal returns.    In our event study, it is hard to verify the exact date 
on the event news partly because the events evolved over several trading days and partly 
because the events could be anticipated in advance.    We therefore need to examine the impacts 
of the events on cumulative stock returns over a longer event window.   Under the 
circumstance, we have little gain by using daily data.     
Some summary statistics for the firms in our sample are shown in Table 7.  As in the 
previous sections, we define the clients of each bank when the bank was one of the top five in 
the loan share.    The table shows that 27 firms are the HTB’s clients, 131 firms the LTCB’s, and 
51 the NCB’s in our sampled firms.    HTB had no bankrupt clients that had listed on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange.  The clients of LTCB and NCB, however, had higher percentages of 
bankruptcies and larger average debt-to-sales ratios than those of other banks in Japan.  
Among 1276 firms, 34 went bankrupt from March 1997 to March 2003.     
The implications of our estimation differ depending on whether we exclude these 34 
bankrupt firms or include them when they are alive during the month(s) in question.  When 
testing the positive revaluation hypothesis, it is desirable to exclude apparently insolvent firms 
that investors may identify.    We therefore estimate equation (1) either excluding these firms or 
including additional dummies for these firms when they are alive.  It is more likely that 
investors can identify these firms as insolvent client firms partly because their financial 
conditions tend to be bad and partly because some information of the lender is revealed in 
advance.    If this is the case, we would be able to test the positive revaluation hypothesis more 
appropriately excluding these firms.     
 
(c) Event Windows 
We run cross-sectional regressions of equation (1) over five alternative event windows: (i) 
the month of the HTB failure (November 1, 1997 to November 28, 1997), (ii) a month before 
LTCB’s nationalization and a month of the nationalization (September 1, 1998 to October 30, 
1998), (iii) a month before NCB’s nationalization and a month of the nationalization (November 
1, 1998 to December 30, 1998), (iv) two months after the new LTCB started its operation 
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(September 1, 2000 to October 31, 2000).  We included a month before the nationalization in 
the event windows (ii) and (iii) because the nationalization was somewhat expected in advance 
for each failed bank.  We, in contrast, used two months after the new bank’s operation for the 
event windows (iv) and (v) because the market investors usually take time to learn management 
styles of the new banks. 
If the HTB failure had unanticipated negative implications for the value of the HTB client 
firms, we would expect that the coefficient γ1 to be negative and statistically significant for the 
event window (i).    If the HTB failures had unanticipated negative externalities for the value of 
the other banks’ clients, we would also expect that the constant term to be negative and 
statistically significant for the event window (i).  Similarly, if the failures of LTCB and NCB 
had unanticipated negative implications for the value of their client firms, we would expect the 
coefficient γ2 to be significantly negative for the event window (ii) and the coefficient γ3 to be 
significantly negative for the event window (iii) respectively.   If the failures had unanticipated 
negative externalities, the constant term would also be negative and statistically significant for 
each of event windows (ii) and (iii). 
The estimation results for the event windows (iv) and (v), in contrast, reflect the impacts of 
the new banks’ operation, which provide direct tests of the positive revaluation hypothesis.  If 
the start of the new LTCB’s operation had an unanticipated positive implication for the value of 
its own client firms, we would expect that the coefficient γ2 to be significantly positive for the 
event window (iv).  If the start of the new NCB’s operation had an unanticipated positive 
impact on the value of its own client firms, we would expect that the coefficients γ3 to be 
significantly positive for the event window (v).  If the new operation had some externality 
impacts on the other banks’ clients, the constant term would also be statistically significant for 
each of event windows (iv) and (v). 
 
 
6. The Impacts on the Stock Prices: Estimation Results 
Table 8 summarizes our estimation results of equation (1), excluding firms that went 
bankrupt before March 2003 (Table 8-1) and including all firms but adding dummies for firms 
that went bankrupt after the event (Table 8-2).    The estimation results for the event windows (i), 
(ii), and (iii) measure the impacts of the three bank failures on the client firms.    The estimation 
results for the event windows (iv) and (v) measure the impacts of two new banks’ operations.  
Although the latter ones derive direct tests of the positive revaluation hypothesis, comparing the 
latter with the former would provide several additional implications on the role of a close 
bank-firm relationship and the existence of “soft budget constraints” before the new bank 
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(a) The Impacts of the three bank failures 
For the event window (i), not only the coefficient γ1 but also the constant term and the other 
two coefficients, γ2 and γ3, are significantly negative in Table 8-1.    Since the absolute value of 
γ1 is larger than the absolute values of γ2 and γ3, the HTB failure had a larger negative impact on 
the value of its own clients than on those of the other two banks’ clients.    However, we can see 
that the HTB failure also had a negative impact on the stock prices of the other banks’ clients, 
particularly the LTCB’s and NCB’s clients.    Since a banking relationship enhances the value of 
the client firm, it is straightforward to see that the HTB failure had an adverse consequence for 
its clients.  The resolution of HTB, however, meant more in Japan, revealing that Japanese 
regulators would no longer use “too-big-to-fail” policies. In the days immediately after the 
HTB’s failures, the Japanese financial market experienced significant turbulence, so that the 
market perceptions on financial institutions’ solvency were pessimistic.  It is thus natural that 
the financial turbulence might have affected not only on the clients of the failed bank but also 
on those of surviving but troubled banks.    The result is essentially the same in Table 8-2.    But 
in Table 8-2, we also observe a negative impact on the other banks’ clients that would go 
bankrupt in the next six years.    This supports the view that the financial turbulence had a larger 
perverse impact on the market valuation of apparently insolvent firms. 
The constant term is still significantly negative for the event window (ii), although its 
absolute value is smaller than that for the event window (i).  This implies that the financial 
turbulence still affected the clients of surviving but troubled banks when LTCB was nationalized.   
The constant term is, however, no longer negative for the event window (iii).  The financial 
turbulence had no additional impact on abnormal returns of the other banks’ clients when NCB 
was  nationalized.   
Both for the event windows (ii) and (iii), none of the coefficients γ1,  γ2, and γ3 is 
significantly negative when excluding the firms that would go bankrupt (Table 8-1).  This 
implies that neither the LTCB’s nor the NCB’s failure announcement had significant impact for 
abnormal returns of their own surviving client firms.  One possible interpretation is that the 
market anticipated the failures of LTCB and NCB in advance.    In our event study, we included 
a month before the nationalization in the event windows (ii) and (iii) to allow for the possibility 
that the nationalization was expected in advance for each failed bank.  The interpretation 
suggests that a month might not be long enough to capture the market anticipation.  Under a 
series of financial turbulences, the stock prices of the clients of LTCB and NCB had declined 
more substantially than those of the other clients before the announcements of their failures.  
The market surprises for the announcements of their failures were thus limited to have further 
 14negative consequences for their clients.     
However, γ2 is positive for the event window (ii) for the firms that would go bankrupt 
(Table 8-2).    This indicates that the LTCB’s failure announcement had a positive impact on the 
value of client firms that would eventually go bankrupt.    Investors knew that some of insolvent 
clients were still alive when the bank practiced “soft budget constraints”.    The positive impact 
may reflect the market anticipation that the LTCB’s “soft budget constraints” would be 
intensified when the LTCB was nationalized. 
 
(b) The Impacts of the two new banks’ operations 
For the event window (iv), the coefficient γ2 takes a large positive value which is 
statistically significant at 5% level when excluding firms that would go bankrupt (Table 8-1).  
The surviving LTCB’s clients experienced significantly larger increases of their market values 
than the other firms after the new bank took over the operation of LTCB.  Since there were 
temporary but dramatic increases of bankruptcies of the LTCB’s clients during the same period, 
the result is consistent with the positive revaluation hypothesis in section 4.  It implies that 
investors perceived the “shock therapy” of the new bank as positive news, generating a positive 
impact on the stock prices of the surviving clients.     
It is, however, noteworthy that the constant term also takes a large positive value which is 
statistically significant at 1% level.    This implies that not only the surviving LTCB’s clients but 
also the other banks’ clients increased their market values significantly after the new bank took 
over the operation of LTCB.  The “shock therapy” of the new LTCB generated positive 
externality impacts on the stock prices of the surviving clients of the other banks. 
We also need to note that for the event window (iv), the coefficient γ2 is negative for the 
firms that would go bankrupt (Table 8-2).  This happened because the market valuation of 
apparently insolvent clients significantly dropped down after the new bank took over the 
operation of LTCB.    The introduction of the “shock therapy” implied that the LTCB would no 
longer practice “soft budget constraints”.  To the extent that they are the clients that could 
survive only under the “soft budget”, it is natural that the “shock therapy” had a negative impact 
on their stock prices.   
For the event window (v), the constant term is significantly negative, implying a negative 
externality impact on the stock prices of the surviving clients of the other banks when the new 
NCB started its operation.  None of the coefficients γ1, γ2, and γ3 is, in contrast, statistically 
significant at 5% level when excluding firms that would go bankrupt (Table 8-1).  The 
insignificance of γ3 implies that most of the NCB’s surviving clients could not improve their 
market valuations after the new bank took over the operation of NCB.  The positive 
revaluation hypothesis is therefore far from relevant for the new NCB.  It is noteworthy that 
 15there were no dramatic increases of bankruptcies of the NCB’s clients during the same period.  
The result supports the view that the new NCB remained practicing “soft budget constraints”.  
Since the new bank allowed insolvent firms to continue to operate, not only insolvent clients but 
also solvent clients faced difficulty in improving their market valuations.  This also generated 




In this paper, we explored what consequences “soft budget constraints” and “shock therapy” 
had in solving bad loan problems in Japan.    In the analysis, we focused on the market valuation 
of the clients of the three large failed Japanese banks, and examined how the number of their 
bankruptcies and their stock prices had reacted after the banks’ operations were taken over by 
the new banks.  As for the clients of LTCB, there were dramatic increases of bankruptcies in 
the short-run but the surviving clients started to show significant recovery of their stock prices 
in the long-run.  In contrast, as for the clients of the other two banks, there was neither 
dramatic increase of bankruptcies in the short-run nor significant recovery of their stock prices 
in the long-run.  The result implies that the choice of “shock therapy” or “soft budget 
constraints” by the new banks had dramatically different impacts on the clients’ market 
valuation. 
During the banking crisis in the late 1990s, it turned out that the failed banks had concealed 
the true extent of their problems in order to reduce the reported amount of nonperforming loans 
on their book or to inflate their reported capital.    The market valuation thus became suspicious 
against the clients of the failed banks.  High default risk may not only result in stagnation of 
the stock prices but also can reduce the firms’ fundamental values.  If the new banks change 
the market perception only gradually, then the market valuation of the clients would remain low 
even after the new banks started their operation.  However, if the new bank chooses a “shock 
therapy”, the stock market might react favorably for the surviving customers.     
In Japan, banks have played an important role in the financing of corporations.  Although 
they were less so for larger Japanese companies after the beginning of the 1990s, banks still 
played an important role for many Japanese firms.  It is thus widely recognized that the 
problem of “bad loans” was one of the major sources for why the slump had been prolonged 
after the collapse of the asset price bubble of the late 1980s.  To the extent that banks allow 
insolvent firms to continue to operate, problems in the banking sector could result in fewer 
profitable investments by firms that are highly dependent on bank financing.  It is an urgent 
issue for the banking sector to find an appropriate prescription for bad loan problems in solving 
the prolonged recession in Japan. 
 16Needless to say, we have to incorporate various other factors when discussing costs and 
benefits of “shock therapy”.    First, it is possible that the shock therapy of the new LTCB killed 
several solvent clients as well as insolvent clients.  If the shock therapy killed several solvent 
clients, then we can no longer justify the shock therapy that had improved the stock prices of the 
LTCB’s clients.  Increases of stock prices of surviving firms do not necessarily mean that the 
“shock therapy” killed no good firm.    Secondly, “shock therapy” may increase the costs of fire 
sale.  The market value of existing capital stock is usually smaller than replacement costs of 
capital.  This is particularly true when existing capital stock has firm-specific properties.  
Unexpected bankruptcy that increases fire sales would thus be accompanied by deterioration of 
the market value of existing capital stock.   When we allow these costs, frequent unexpected 
bankruptcy under the “shock therapy” may not be desirable in reducing the costs of fire sale.  
Thirdly, the value of healthy firms may change under “shock therapy”.  In our paper, we 
implicitly assumed that the fundamental value of healthy firms is constant.  However, 
increased uncertainty may decrease the value of healthy firms.  Frequent bankruptcies may 
affect other clients of the failed bank through limiting the availability of additional products, 
parts, and service among the clients.    The price a customer is willing to pay for durable goods 
declines as the probability of the firm’s liquidation increases reflecting the increase in expected 
maintenance costs.    When default risk is high, turnovers of good employees may also increase.   
If these negative consequences are large, the “shock therapy” of the new bank could have other 
costly impacts.    More general discussions incorporating these factors would be desirable in our 
future research. 
 17Appendix 1.    A Brief Description of Events on Three Banks 
 
(i) Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (HTB) 
HTB was the smallest city bank but the biggest bank in the Hokkaido region in northern 
Japan.  Its assets were more than 9.5 trillion yen that was one of the largest 20 commercial 
banks in Japan.    HTB failed when its regulatory agency-arranged merger with Hokkaido Bank 
(the second biggest bank in the Hokkaido region) was abandoned because of a disagreement 
over the extent of bad loans of HTB.    On November 17, 1997, the bank announced that, due to 
its difficulty in raising funds, it would transfer its operations in the Hokkaido region in northern 
Japan to the North Pacific Bank.  Its operations outside of Hokkaido were eventually sold to 
Chuo Trust and Banking Co.  In the days immediately after the HTB’s failures, the Japanese 
financial market experienced significant turbulence.  Despite the large extent of liquidity 
provision by the bank of Japan, domestic credit lines to weaker companies were reduced and 
stock prices of financial institutions dropped significantly.    Yamaichi Securities, one of the four 
large securities houses, was among the institutions that suffered the most and closed on 
November 25, 1997.  On November 17, 1998, the operation of HTB was transferred to the 
North Pacific Bank and to Chuo Trust and Banking Co. 
 
(ii) The Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) 
LTCB was the second largest long-term credit bank in Japan.  Despite an injection of 
capital from the government in March 1998, its debt was downgraded several times and its 
share price dropped sharply.    There was a regulator-sanctioned merger attempt to rescue LTCB.   
A merger attempt with Sumitomo Trust Bank, however, failed in the summer of 1998.  On 
October 19, 1998, news reports indicated that the newly-established Financial Supervisory 
Agency (FSA) had informed LTCB earlier in the day that the bank was insolvent on a 
market-value basis as of the end of September, when it was last inspected.  The reports also 
indicated that LTCB was expected to be nationalized later in the week, when recently adopted 
banking legislation would take effect.    Four days later on October 23, 1998, LTCB applied for 
nationalization.  According to the FSA report, at the end of September, the bank had total 
assets of 24 trillion yen and 160 billion yen in book-value capital.  It also reports 500 billion 
yen, or three times its book value capital, of unrealized losses on its securities portfolio and 
other assets totaling 4.62 trillion yen, or 19 percent of total assets and roughly 30 times its 
capital.  The losses to the shareholders of LTCB had already been occurred before the time of 
its nationalization.  The bank’s stock price, which was 210 yen at the beginning of the year, 
had eroded to 58 yen by June 25, 1988.    By the time the bank was nationalized, its stock price 
had declined to 2 yen.  LTCB was sold to a group of American investors led by Ripplewood 
 18Holdings LLC, which paid 1 billion yen for the bank and injected an additional 120 billion yen 
in capital.  The new bank also received 240 billion yen of public capital from the Financial 
Reconstruction Commission in March 2000.  The new bank started its operation on March 1, 
2000.    The new bank changed its name to Shinsei Bank, Ltd. on June 5, 2000. 
 
(iii) The Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) 
Founded as the Nippon Fudosan Bank in 1957, NCB traditionally focused on loans secured 
by land collateral.    The bank expanded its real estate related loans even more in the late 1980s.   
As the land prices fell in the 1990s, many of its real estate-related loans and loans to non-bank 
affiliates became non-performing.  The semi-annual public financial statements issued by all 
Japanese banks on November 24, 1998, for six months ending September 30 showed that NCB 
with assets of 7.7 trillion yen as of September 1998 had significant amount of problem loans 
and that its earnings had deteriorated significantly since March 1998.  However, the bank 
stated that it was still solvent.  On December 9, 1998, it was announced that NCB was 
abandoning its previously announced merger with Chuo Trust and Banking Co.  The 
abandoned merger was perceived as a sign of further problems at NCB.  Shortly thereafter, 
news reports indicated that the FSA’s examination of the bank showed that as of March 31, 1998, 
contrary to what NCB had reported, the bank had a capital deficit of 94.4 billion yen and was 
insolvent.    On December 12, the government urged NCB to apply for nationalization, which it 
did on the next business day – December 14, and started special public management under the 
Financial Reconstruction Law.  Unlike LTCB, the stock price of NCB increased from 114 yen 
at the beginning of 1998 to 158 yen the day before its failure.    Its stock holders were, however, 
wiped out and lost significant amounts when NCB was nationalized.  NCB was sold to a 
consortium of Japanese investors led by SOFTBANK CORP., ORIX Corporation, The Tokio 
Marine and Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., and other financial institutions.  Special public 
management ended and the new bank started its operation on September 1, 2000.  The new 




 19Appendix 2.    Outline of “cancellation right” (warranty of loan related assets) 
 
The followings, which are based on news release from FSA, are outline of the basic 
agreement on “cancellation right” (Article 7: warranty of loan related assets).    It was made by 
and among, the Depository Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "DIC"), The 
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "LTCB") and New LTCB 
Partners CV (hereinafter referred to as "New LTCB Partners") as of December 24, 1999.  The 
same cancellation right was agreed for acquisition of NCB. 
 
1. Cancellation 
(1) In the transaction contemplated by this Basic Agreement and the Definitive Agreement, DIC 
will be deemed to have transferred the Loan Related Assets to LTCB as of the Closing Date. 
LTCB shall have a right (hereinafter referred to as the "Cancellation Right") to cancel a portion 
of sale of the Loan Related Assets, retroactively effective as of the Closing Date, if a defect is 
found and 20% reduction of value is recognized in association with the Loan Related Assets 
during the three years after the Closing Date. 
(2) Existence of Defect shall mean a case where, for those loans judged to be "appropriate for 
LTCB to continue to own" by the FRC, the basis of such judgment as "appropriate" turns out to 
have changed or become untrue within three years from the Base Date. The cases are not 
regarded as a Defect where the book value reduction is caused by any reason attributable solely 
to New LTCB Partners, or New LTCB after the purchase of LTCB. 
(3) The Cancellation Right shall be exercisable at any time on or prior to the 3rd anniversary of 
the Closing Date; provided, however, that LTCB may extend such term for another three months 
after the 3rd anniversary of the Closing Date, solely for the purpose of establishing and 
presenting the facts as they were on or prior to the 3rd anniversary. 
(4) 20% reduction means that the aggregate book value (minus the loan loss reserves at such 
time) for all loans to a borrower is reduced by 20% or more from the aggregate initial book 
value (minus the initial loan loss reserves). 
(5) If a request for abandonment of claims is made (upon which a Defect is deemed to have 
occurred) and accepted by the new LTCB, the Cancellation Right shall be deemed to have been 
waived.  On the other hand, a request for easement of lending conditions is made by a 
borrower who is in financial difficulties in an attempt for restructuring (upon which a Defect is 
deemed to have occurred) and accepted by the new LTCB under circumstances where there is a 
reasonable ground for DIC to consider such request as reasonable, the Cancellation Right shall 
not be deemed to have been waived at that time, and the exercise of the Cancellation Right shall 
be held for three years from the Base Date. 
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2. Effect of Cancellation 
(1) When a Cancellation Right is exercised, DIC will pay LTCB an amount equal to the Initial 
Book Value (the Initial Principal Amount less the Applicable Initial Loan Loss Reserve) of such 
canceled Loan Related Assets and in exchange DIC will obtain such Loan Related Assets. If 
LTCB has received principal payments of the relevant Loan Related Asset or proceeds from the 
sale of collateral or guarantor (including corporations) payments, DIC may deduct such amounts 
from the amount to be paid to LTCB mentioned above.    Whenever LTCB intends to transfer a 
Loan Related Asset to DIC, LTCB may negotiate in each case with DIC to repurchase such 
Loan Related Asset from DIC at the then Current Book Value after deducting the amount of the 
loan loss reserve. 
(2) If an event of force majeure such as war, natural calamity or economic great depression 
occurs within three years after the purchase of LTCB and a debtor's condition is deteriorated as 
a result thereof, the payment obligation of DIC shall be subject to restriction. If an event which 
appears to come within the force majeure, DIC and LTCB shall discuss in good faith the 
relevant matters including as to whether the event constitutes the force majeure and whether the 
deterioration of the debtor was caused by that force majeure event and shall determine the fair 
shares of the burden between the parties. 
 
3. Procedures for Cancellation 
In the event LTCB elects to exercise the Cancellation Right with respect to one or more Loan 
Related Assets, or portion thereof, LTCB shall deliver to DIC a cancellation notice. Such notice 
shall be made on a quarterly basis. DIC shall pay the Initial Book Value of the canceled Loan 
Related Assets within the period determined in the Definitive Agreement from the receipt of 
such notice unless DIC sends notice to LTCB notifying LTCB of DIC's intention to dispute the 
determination. If DIC sends such notice to LTCB, DIC and LTCB shall faithfully discuss. If 
such discussion is not successful, the determination shall be reviewed by an internationally 
recognized accounting firm that LTCB and DIC mutually agree. LTCB and DIC will respect the 
results of the review by such accounting firm; provided, however, that this shall not deny the 
right of LTCB or DIC to file a suit in respect of the result of such review. Whenever DIC 
determines to comply with the results of the review of the accounting firm or the decision of the 
court confirming DIC's payment obligation becomes final, DIC shall pay the Initial Book Value 
of the canceled Loan Related Assets.  The Definitive Agreement shall contain more detailed 
procedures for exercise of the Cancellation Right. 
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Table 1: Loan outstanding by major banks




Clients that had HTB in Top 5
lenders in March 1998
Clients that didn’t have HTB in
Top 5 lenders but its loan share
exceeded 5% in March 1998
Total Number of Clients 38 12
Number of clients whose loan were
taken over by North Pacific Bank
10 2
Number of clients whose loan were
taken over by Chuo Trust Bank
20 9
Number of clients whose loan were
taken over by RCC
10
Number of clients whose loan were
taken over by Other Financial
Institution
51
Number of clients whose loan were
transferred to nobody
30
Table2: Status of HTB clients extracted from all non-financial firms listed on TSE and other local
exchanges
Note.) The loan of one client firm was taken over by both of North Pacific Bank and Chuo Trust Bank. And the loan of
another client firm was transferred to both of Chuo Trust Bank and RCC.
Source: Kigyo Keiretsu Soran 2000, published by Toyo Keizai  
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4 4753872 1 8 1 3 9 1 2 92
H T B  c l i e n t s 1 01000001002 5
L T C B  c l i e n t s 0 01225115500 22
N C B  c l i e n t s 1 11100002202 10
O t h e r  b a n k  c l i e n t s 2 3521361 1 1 799 59
























741 747 708 97 448 2,113 301 1,401 1,996 750 194 300 9,797
H T B  c l i e n t s 1 30 1 600000 3 100 4 0 1
LTCB clients 0 0 16 49 439 1,807 24 13 1,291 156 0 0 3,795
N C B  c l i e n t s 6 9 4 1 4 2 5 0 3 30000 3 7 3 0 30 5 8 1 , 1
Other bank clients 659 334 442 15 9 307 277 1,388 668 323 194 237 4,852
Note 4). For four companies that had more than one failed bank in top five lenders, they are defined as the clients of plural failed banks.
Source: Websites of Teikoku Data Bank and Tokyo Shoko Research
Total amount of liability
of the  bankrupt listed
companies in Japan
Note 1). Sample: All companies, excluding banks and insurers, listed on eight stock exchanges (Tokyo, Osaka, Sapporo, Niigata, Nagoya, Kyoto,
Hiroshima and Fukuoka) and three over-the-counter markets (JASDAQ, Mothers, and NASDAQ JAPAN).
Note 2). The first half of fiscal year (FY) is from April 1 to September 30, and the second half is from October 1 to March 31.
Note 3). The "clients" of the failed bank are identified if each failed bank was one of the top five lenders as of end of fiscal year 1998 (only for HTB
clients, as of end of fiscal year 1997). The "Other bank clients" are defined as firms that didn't have three failed banks in the top five lenders.
FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 Total (Dec-
97 to Sep-
03)



















First half Second half First half Second half First half Second half First half
New LTCB (Shinsei
Bank) clients
51 32 17 21 10 5 5
New NCB (Aozora
Bank) clients
25 14 12 23 12 7 15
FY2003
First half Second half First half Second half First half Second half First half
New LTCB (Shinsei
Bank) clients
401.2 213.8 37.6 169.7 42.1 0.0 1.8
New NCB (Aozora
Bank) clients
42.2 47.7 7.7 26.5 72.8 4.4 11.1
Note ). Sample: All clients of Shinsei and Aozora bank, excluding clients whose amount of loan is less than 50 million
yen.
Source: Shinsei and Aozora's reports on "business revitalization plan", submitted to the Financial
Service Agency each half of the fiscal year.
2. Total amount of loans to the bankrupt clients (Unit: billion yen)
FY2000 FY2001 FY2002
Table 4:  Summary for the bankrupt clients of New LTCB and New NCB









Total 54 133 209 296 381 442
(Unit: billion yen)





Total 228.9 600.8 780.7 1,057.6 1,336.4 1,555.4
(Unit: billion yen)





Total 117.9 335.9 484.7 725.8 930.7 1,131.2
41 110 168 232
994.9 1,170.2





16.5 42.8 70.5 205.9
710.2 851.7
111.6 312.0 442.5 565.5
42.1 160.3 240.9 278.2
Note.) The “amount of book value of the loans” is the book value of loan outstanding that the DIC purchased by the
request of new banks. The “amount of payment” is the actual payments from the DIC to new banks. The difference
between two amounts mainly reflects the reserves for loan losses.
Source: The Financial Service Agency
Table 5: Status of Implementation of Cancellation Right by New Banks
1. Number of clients
2. Amount of book value of the loans






1. New LTCB (Shinsei Bank)
Delay of repayments,
effectively insolvent, or
request to ease borrowing
condition






Normal 14 0 7
Needs attention 10 5 11
Needs management 72




Data are summarized as of September 30, 2002 by the DIC.
2. New NCB (Aozora Bank)
Delay of repayments,
effectively insolvent, or


















Data are summarized as of September 30, 2002 by the DIC.




Borrower Classfication when the
new bank took over
Table 6: Implementation of the cancellation right by the new banks (as of end of September 2002)





Borrower Classfication when the
new bank took over
Bankrupt clients









HTB clients LTCB clients NCB clients Other bank clients
Number of sample firms 27 131 51 1,078
Number of surviving firms 27 120 48 1,057
Number of bankrupt firms 0 11 3 21
(Share in sample firms; %) (0.0%) (8.3%) (5.8%) (1.9%)
Average Sales 88,149 165,911 159,101 269,290
(Median) (54,835) (69,791) (63,685) (64,327)
Average Debt to Sales
Ratio
0.51 1.05 1.01 0.72
(Median) (0.48) (0.77) (0.77) (0.61)
Table 7: Summary Statistics for Sample Firms
1). The “clients” of the failed bank are identified if each failed bank was one of top five lenders as of end of fiscal year
1997 (only for HTB clients, as of end of fiscal year 1996). The “Other bank clients” are defined as firms that didn’t have
three failed banks in the top five lenders.
2). Sample firms are 1,276 non-financial firms listed on the first and the second sections in TSE excluding gas and electric
power companies. Sample also excludes the firms that had no external borrowing and that had been delisted as a result of





























-0.089*** -0.036*** 0.002 0.091*** -0.015***
(-21.563) (-6.422) (0.524) (13.881) (-3.160)
-0.053** 0.047 -0.034 -0.011 0.004
(-2.378) (1.545) (-1.168) (-0.311) (0.163)
-0.020* 0.022 -0.003 0.044** 0.013
(-1.800) (1.455) (-0.264) (2.481) (1.040)
-0.044*** 0.025 -0.002 -0.881 -0.026
(-2.586) (1.100) (-0.133) (-0.032) (-1.314)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.049 0.004 0.008 0.042 0.023
Note 1). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisk, ***, **, or *, means that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%,
or 10% level, respectively.
Note 2). Abnormal returns at each event month are estimated by the market model using 60 monthly rates of returns from one
months before each event month. Estimation periods are Nov. 1992 through Oct. 1997 for event (i), Sep. 1993 through Aug. 1998
for event (ii), Nov. 1993 through Oct. 1998 for event (iii), Mar. 1995 through Feb. 2000 for event (iv), and Sep. 1995 through
Aug. 2000 for event (v), respectively.
Constant term
Dummy for HTB clients
Dummy for LTCB clients
Dummy for NCB clients
Table 8-1: Event studies using abnormal returns data (surviving firms)
Sample: 1,242 surviving firms (excluding bankrupt firms)




























(Sep. 2000 and Oct.
2000)
-0.090*** -0.036*** 0.003 0.090*** -0.015***
(-21.700) (-6.413) (0.622) (13.942) (-3.060)
-0.053** 0.046 -0.033 -0.011 0.004
(-2.392) (1.494) (-1.119) (-0.326) (0.161)
-0.020* 0.020 -0.003 0.044** 0.013
(-1.788) (1.343) (-0.231) (2.473) (1.018)
-0.044*** 0.021 -0.001 -0.001 -0.027
(-2.577) (0.916) (-0.079) (-0.047) (-1.344)
-0.049 0.161*** -0.030 -0.155** -0.087
(-1.333) (3.161) (-0.633) (-2.384) (-1.344)
-0.038 -0.221** 0.031 0.034 -0.071
(-0.548) (-2.318) (0.346) (0.252) (-0.696)
-0.137*** -0.038 0.055* 0.067 -0.121***
(-5.425) (-1.088) (1.676) (1.636) (-3.918)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.076 0.023 0.011 0.048 0.035
Number of Observations 1,276 1,276 1,276 1,273 1,270
Note 2). Abnormal returns at each event month are estimated by the market model using 60 monthly rates of returns from one
month before each event month. Estimation periods are Nov. 1992 through Oct. 1997 for event (i), Sep. 1993 through Aug. 1998
for event (ii), Nov. 1993 through Oct. 1998 for event (iii), Mar. 1995 through Feb. 2000 for event (iv), and Sep. 1995 through Aug.





Dummy for Other banks'
insolvent clients
Note 1). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisk, ***, **, or *, means that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%,
or 10% level, respectively.
Constant term
Dummy for HTB clients
Dummy for LTCB clients
Dummy for NCB clients
Table 8-2: Event studies using abnormal returns data  (all firms including bankruput firms)
Sample: All firms that were alive as of each event month.
Dependent variable: (cumulative) abnormal return of firm i
 











1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003




Note 1). “Risk management loans” are the sum of (1) loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy, (2) past 
due loans in arrears by 6 months or more, (3) loans in arrears by 3 months or more and less than 6 
months, and (4) restructured loans. 
Note 2). "Major 11 Banks" are City Banks, Long-term Credit Banks and Trust Banks but exclude 
Shinsei Bank and Aozora Bank. 










1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
All Banks Major Banks
trillion yen
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